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Abstract
It has long been argued in the history of economic thought that over investment
through highly leveraged borrowing under elastic credit supply may generate large boom-
bust business cycles. This paper rationalizes this idea in a dynamic general equilib-
rium model with innitely lived rational agents. It shows that dynamic interactions be-
tween strong asset-accumulation motives (based on habit formation on the borrower side)
and elastic credit supply (based on collateralized lending on the lender side) generate a
multiplier-accelerator mechanism that can transform a one-time technological innovation
into large and long-lasting boom-bust cycles. Such cycles share many features in common
to investment bubbles observed in the history (such as the IT bubble in the 1990s and the
2000s housing bubble.).
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1 Introduction
This paper is a theoretical study on the causes and mechanisms of large boom-bust cycles fea-
turing excessive investment and capital accumulation. We want to know what economic forces
can transform a one-time technological innovation or a short period of prosperity into long
and large bubble-like booms, and why the "bubbles" eventually burst. We pay attention to the
traditional "over investment" theory of the business cycle (e.g., Tugan-Baranovsky, 1894; Wick-
sell, 1898 and 1906) and ask whether such theory holds water in dynamic general equilibrium
where national investment must be nanced entirely by domestic savings. A Keynesian econo-
mist may argue that periods of persistent consumption growth can foster investment booms
and output expansion, which in turn reinforces optimistic outlooks for permanent income and
further stimulate consumption demand. So a mild consumption expansion triggered by opti-
mism may turn into prolonged periods of over-expansion. However, in the absence of increasing
returns to scale or continuous new technological progress to improve productivity, how is a
boom sustainable when consumption crowds out savings yet investment must be nanced by
savings? The history of economic thought suggests that elastic credit supply from the nancial
sector may be the culprit. But Tugan and Wicksells arguments rely on partial equilibrium
analysis and, in particular, on the assumption that aggregate investment does not always equal
aggregate savings.1
We investigate the issue in a general-equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents. We
nd that when borrowers have strong incentives to accumulate assets and lenders are willing
to supply credit elastically, endogenous boom-bust cycles can emerge and such cycles resemble
excessive investment and over accumulation of capital during the boom and under investment
in the slump. Two factors are needed to support the excessive investment boom in our model.
Habit formation or catching-up-with-the-Joneses (CUWJ thereafter) preferences on the bor-
rower side generate a strong incentive to postpone consumption and accumulate wealth in the
short run so as to raise consumption in the long run. This encourages capital investment by
providing loanable funds. It also generates persistence in consumption growth, which ensures
rmsprospect of future sales. In addition, when borrowing is constrained by the value of collat-
eralized assets, the incentives for investment are compounded because undertaking investment
1Tugan-Baranovsky (1894) argued that industrial cycles were driven by an independent investment function
and that, ultimately, over-investment was the cause of recessions. Similarly, Wicksell (1906) proposed making
investment independent of savings so aggregate demand is free to rise above or fall below a given level of
aggregate supply. For a review of Tugan-Baranovskys economic theory on business cycles, see Barnett (2001).
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improves the borrowers credit worthiness, which relaxes their future borrowing constraints.
These two factors reinforce each other dynamically, generating a cumulative process of expan-
sion once the economy is shocked by good news in the borrowersproductivity. More precisely,
the interaction works as follows. Suppose that there is a one-percent unexpected positive shock
to total factor productivity (TFP henceforth). At the impact period, the borrowers propensity
to save rises substantially because habit formation creates a strong incentive to save the tran-
sitory extra income so as to increase consumption in the long run. This motive is reinforced by
the borrowers will to borrow and invest so as to relax collateral constraints in the future. The
outcome of this investment boom in the next period is that, although the shock is gone, the bor-
rowers stocks of productive inputs rise so much that the e¤ect on output may be several times
larger than the initial one-percent TFP increase. Therefore, the impulse response function of
output is hump-shaped. In contrast, absent CUWJ, the extra income is consumed rather than
saved, which leads to a monotonic impulse response of output with small persistence. However,
because of diminishing marginal product of capital, over-investment is not sustainable by ag-
gregate savings and a rising debt level will ultimately erode the borrowersaggregate demand
(consumption and investment), resulting in a collapse of the "bubble" followed by a recession.
In the downturn phase, the sluggish behavior of consumption and investment under CUWJ
forces the economy to converge back to steady state in a cyclical fashion. Therefore, output
falls below its long run level for a while so that a recession inevitably follows the investment
boom.
To summarize, the boom-bust cycles are created by a multiplier-accelerator mechanism,
which translates a one-time positive technology shock into large and highly persistent move-
ments in aggregate spending and output. At the peak of the expansion, the increases in the
capital stock and output are several times larger than their initial responses to the shock, and
in the contraction phase, they over-shoot their long-run steady-state level from above. In this
process an initial boom plants the seed for a future recession and vice versa.
Our formulation of procyclical credit supply borrows from Kiyotaki and Moore (KM 1997),
who have shown that endogenous credit limits based on the value of collateralized assets lead to
credit cycles when combined with a particular form of lumpy investment. However, subsequent
investigations have found that such a propagation mechanism disappears when embedded into
a standard RBC model (see, for example, Kocherlakota, 2000; and Cordoba and Ripoll, 2004).
Our approach overcomes this shortcoming. As in Iacoviello (2005), in our model the nancial
sector (the lender) does not produce tangible goods. This is consistent with the role of nancial
institutions in the real world where the major role of banks is to provide loans (credit) rather
than directly engaging in goods production. Under collateral constraints, a small transitory
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shock can generate a large response in aggregate output because of the reallocation of productive
resources from unproductive agents (the lenders) to the productive but credit-constrained agents
(the borrowers). In our model, since lenders do not produce goods, any extension of credit
from lenders to borrowers strictly increases aggregate output. This feature captures the fact
emphasized by Wicksell that resources (credit or money) hoarded by banks do not contribute to
GDP unless they are lent out. In the models of KM (1997) and others, both the borrowers and
the lenders produce goods and contribute to aggregate output. Thus, extending credit from
lenders to borrowers increases the borrowersoutput but decreases the lendersoutput. As a
result, output of the banking sector is countercyclical and the multiplier e¤ect on aggregate
output is dampened. In reality, lending out resources by the banking sector does not reduce
the sectors output; if anything, it increases it.2
The key distinction between our approach and that of the existing literature is that we
focus on the joint role of consumers and investors in creating boom-bust business cycles.3
Although its importance in understanding asset returns and consumption behaviors has been
well acknowledged in the literature, the role of habit formation in generating boom-bust business
cycles has not been fully appreciated and thoroughly analyzed.4 In this paper we push this
argument further by showing that dynamic interactions between collateralized lending (on the
supply side of credit) and CUWJ (on the demand side of credit) create strong incentives for over-
investment and thus lead to boom-bust business cycles. This result is obtained despite strongly
diminishing returns to investment, in sharp contrast to KM (1997) and Aghion, Banerjee, and
Piketty (1999), who assume linear technologies and constant savings rates.5
2Although nancial services are a component of GDP, its share in GDP is trivial. On the other hand, the
nancial (banking) sector is the single most important asset holder and loanable-funds provider of the economy.
The assets and credit resources of this sector are not used for goods production, but for generating loans. In
this paper, we model the lenders as providing nancial services only, in constrast to KM and Cordoba-Ripoll.
3Wicksell (1906) argued that over-investment is the cause, rather than a consequence, of the boom-bust
cycles. In particular, he emphasized the gap between the natural rate (determined by the marginal products
of assets) and the loan rate as an important mechanism for driving investment booms and slumps. However,
Wicksell seems to also have acknowledged that the natural rate must be realizable in terms of revenue; otherwise
rms will not undertake investment no matter how high the natural rate is above the loan rate (see Boianovsky,
1995). That is, the marginal product of capital is measurable only in terms of marginal utilities of consumption.
This is why in our general-equilibrium model persistent consumption demand (or expected consumption growth)
is needed, in addition to any deviations of the natural rate from the loan rate, for triggering the multiplier-
accelerator mechanism. This is similar to Wicksells emphasis on persistent commodity-price increases as a
trigger of an investment boom and the credit cycle.
4See, e.g., Abel (1990), Constantinides (1990), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Carroll, Overland, and Weil
(2000), Fuhrer (2000), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (1997, 2001), Michaelides
(2002), Alvarez-Cuadrado, Monteiro, and Turnovsky (2004), and Wen (2009), among others. In this literature,
habit formation takes two forms, external and internal. We use the former, which corresponds to catching-up-
with-the-Joneses. However, internal habit formation gives similar results because it acts as competition for living
standards with ones own historical self. For the early literature on the relationship between habit-formation
and cycles, see Ryder and Heal (1973) and their followers.
5In the original KM model, the emergence of the credit cycle relies crucially on the interaction between
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Collateralized credit lending is not by itself su¢ cient for generating credit cycles. Without
additional savings to provide loanable funds and without anticipated persistent increase in
consumption demand, rms do not have a strong enough incentive to over-invest or to expand
production capacity excessively, even though doing so can relax their borrowing constraints and
improve credit worthiness. Hence, additional incentives for savings and persistent consumption
growth through external or internal consumption habits are key.
The literature on business cycles with credit market frictions has shown how nancial fric-
tions may generate hump-shaped output dynamics.6 Our paper complements the existing
studies, as we prove that credit market frictions, when interacted with competition for liv-
ing standards, create not only hump-shaped dynamics but also highly persistent dampened
cycles. Proving the presence of cycles is important because it frees the RBC approach from
relying on technological regress (that is, negative TFP shocks) to generate recessions.
Our model still has some shortcomings. First, because our model focuses on over-investment
as a possible cause of large bubbles, it does not match the business cycle facts at normal times
when there may not exist excessive investment. In particular, investment in our model is exces-
sively volatile compared to regular business cycles. We have checked that capital adjustment
costs helps reducing investment volatility while keeping the multiplier-accelerator alive. Allow-
ing for more sectors with some sectors featuring over-investment and others featuring normal-or
under-investment may also solve this problem. Second, in order to generate complex eigenval-
ues in our model, we need not only a strong degree of habit formation, but also a small value
of the time discounting factor of the borrower. That is, we need the borrower to be willing
to postpone consumption into the future (consumption smoothing under habit formation) yet
at the same time impatient. Why this is the case is still somewhat puzzling to us. The only
explanation we have is that a high degree of impatience implies a stronger incentive to borrow,
thus easing over-investment.
credit constraints and lumpy investment under linear production technologies. A linear technology implies that
output moves one-for-one with capital, which enhances the multiplier e¤ect of credit borrowing and investment
on output. Lumpy investment implies an uncoupling of the borrowersaggregate borrowing from their aggregate
asset holdings, which generates an accelerator e¤ect in the setup of KM. In contrast, we assume standard Cobb-
Douglas technologies and neoclassical capital accumulation. In fact, the multiplier-accelerator mechanism in
our model is much stronger than that under linear technologies and lumpy investment. For example, a one-time
increase in productivity can lead to as large as a vefold increase in aggregate output several periods later in
our model with capital and labor, whereas it causes only negligible changes in aggregate output after the impact
period in the KM model. In contrast to the existing literature, our results continue to hold even when lenders
are risk averse and the share of land in production is very small (e.g., 5 percent or less) despite the fact that
land may be the only collateralized asset for the borrower.
6As exemplied by the contributions of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Krish-
namurthy (2003), Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini (2004), Iacoviello (2005), Campbell and Hercowitz (2006),
Bohá¼cek and Rodríguez Mendizábal (2007), Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2007), and Iacoviello and Neri
(2008) among many others. Iacoviello and Neri (2008) estimate a model that shares many similarities with ours
but they do not focus on boom-bust cycles.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a basic general-equilibrium
model of credit cycles with reproducible capital. In the model, lenders do not produce goods
but own land. Borrowers produce goods by using land, capital and inelastic labor as factors
of production. It is shown that this model can generate boom-bust cycles under standard
parameter values. Section 3 introduces elastic labor and shows that endogenous labor supply
can further amplify the multiplier-accelerator mechanism if the income e¤ect on labor supply
is small. Implications of constant-rate tax policies and policy shocks are also analyzed. Section
4 concludes the paper with remarks for future research.
2 The Basic Model
2.1 Structure
There are two types of agents in the economy, lenders and borrowers. Lenders do not produce,
but provide loans (credit) to borrowers. In this sense, lenders serve the role of banks or nancial
institutions in the economy. The type of credit provided by lenders are one-period loans that
can be used to nance consumption and investment. Lenders hold assets and derive utilities
from consumption and land,7 do not accumulate xed capital, and use interest income (prots)
from payment on previous loans to nance current consumption and land investment. The
budget constraint of a representative lender is given by
~Ct +Qt(~Lt+1   ~Lt) +Bt+1  (1 +Rt)Bt; (1)
where ~C denotes consumption, ~Lt the amount of land owned by the lender in the beginning of
period t, Qt the relative price of land, Bt+1 the amount of new loans (credit lending) generated
in period t, and Rt the real interest rate. The utility function of the lender is given by
Ul( ~C; ~L) =
~C1 l
1  l + b
~L1 w
1  w ; fl; w; bg  0; (2)
and the time discounting factor is ~ 2 (0; 1).
Borrowers can produce goods using land and capital.8 The production technology is given
by
Yt = AK

t L

t ; ;  2 (0; 1); +  < 1; (3)
7As pointed out in Iacoviello (2005), introducing land in the utility function generates a demand for assets.
8Labor is xed in the basic model. Elastic labor will be introduced into the model in section 3.
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where A is TFP, L denotes the amount of land owned by the borrower, and K denotes his
capital stock.9 Capital is reproducible and the total amount of land is in xed supply,
Lt + ~Lt = L: (4)
Although it is not essential, we allow land in the model for two purposes: (i) to study asset price
movements and their role in a¤ecting the collateral value; and (ii) to keep the model comparable
to KM and the following literature. A representative borrower in each period needs to nance
consumption (C), land investment (Lt+1 Lt), capital investment (Kt+1  (1  )Kt), and loan
payment that includes both the principal (B) and the interest (RB), where  2 (0; 1) is the
depreciation rate of capital. The budget constraint of the borrower is given by
Ct +Kt+1   (1  )Kt +Qt(Lt+1   Lt) + (1 +Rt)Bt  Bt+1 + AKt Lt : (5)
The momentary utility function of the representative borrower is given by
Ub(C) =

Ct    Ct 1
1 B
1  B ; B  0; (6)
where  2 (0; 1) measures the degree of habits in consumption and C denotes the average
consumption of the borrowers.10 Borrowers are assumed to be less patient than lenders; hence,
their time discounting factor satises  < ~.
The borrowing constraint faced by the borrower is
(1 +Rt+1)Bt+1  Qt+1Lt+1 + (1  )Kt+1; (7)
where  2 (0; 1) measures the collateral value of the non-depreciated capital stock. KM assume
that reproducible capital does not have collateral value, which corresponds to the case with
 = 0.11 The borrowing constraint imposes that the amount of debt in the beginning of the
next period cannot exceed the collateral value of assets owned by the borrower next period.
The rationale for this constraint is that, due to lack of contractual enforceability, the lender
has incentives to lend only if the loan is secured by the value of the collateral.12
9As in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), we assume that rental markets for assets do not exist.
10The results are similar when habit formation is internalized. We choose to present the external habit model
because it is simpler. Our main result also holds under multiplicative habits, as in Abel (1990).
11If capital is rm specic, then it has little collateral value on the market. However, our results are not
sensitive to the value of .
12For more discussions on this, see Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Kiyotaki (1998).
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2.2 Allocation without Borrowing Constraints
In this subsection, we derive an allocation that obtains in a "rst-best" environment with
perfect risk sharing, absent the credit constraint (7).13 We show that there is no credit cycle.
The allocation is equivalent to the solution to the following representative-agents program:
max
1X
t=0
(
t

Ct    Ct 1
1 B
1  B +
~t
"
~C1 lt
1  l + b
~L1 wt
1  w
#)
subject to
Ct + ~Ct +Kt+1   (1  )Kt  AKt Lt (8)
Lt + ~Lt  L (9)
The rst-order conditions are given by
t [Ct   Ct 1] B = ~t ~C lt (10)
~t ~C lt = ~
t+1 ~C lt+1


Yt+1
Kt+1
+ 1  

(11)
~t ~C lt 
Yt
Lt
= ~tb~L wt (12)
In the limit, because ~ > , equation (10) implies limt!1 [Ct   Ct 1] B = 0 provided
that limt!1 ~Ct > 0; which in turn implies that the borrowers consumption level goes to zero
in the limit, limt!1Ct = 0.14 Equation (11) gives the modied golden-rule capital-to-output
ratio in the steady state, K
Y
= 
~
1 ~(1 ) , where
~ is the inverse of the gross interest rate.
The resource constraint (8) implies the lenders consumption-to-output ratio, ~C
Y
= 1   K
Y
=
1   ~
1 ~(1 ) . Equation (12) implies 
Y
L
~C l = b
 
L  L w , which uniquely solves for the
steady-state allocation of land between the two agents because the left-hand side is decreasing
in the borrowers land holding L; limL!0 LHS =1, and the right-hand side is increasing in it,
limL!LRHS =1.
In the "rst-best" allocation, the dynamics of the model is very similar to that of a standard
RBC model. Hence, there is no hump-shaped cyclical propagation mechanism for realistic
13By "rst-best" allocation we mean allocation with perfect risk sharing without borrowing constraints. The
results are derived under external habit formation but are similar under internal habit formation.
14Since the lender is more patient with a lower discounting rate, we must have ~C > C in the steady state.
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parameter values. To see this, notice that the above program is a standard RBC model with
two consumption goods except the relative price of C is innity in the steady state. Hence,
near the steady state we can ignore the weight of the borrowers consumption in the utility
function and set Ct = 0. The lenders land ~L in utility plays the role of leisure and the
borrowers land L in the production function plays the role of hours worked. The aggregate
land supply L is equivalent to time endowment. Therefore, as in a standard RBC model, a one-
time shock to productivity will have zero persistence in aggregate output. Replacing external
habit formation by internal habit formation does not change this basic feature of standard
RBC models.15 Although the rst-best allocation is derived for simplicity under utilitarian
social preferences, we conjecture that cycles are ruled out under more general social welfare
functions.
2.3 Competitive Equilibrium with Borrowing Constraints
Denoting ~ as the Lagrangian multiplier of the constraint (1), the rst-order conditions of the
lender with respect to consumption, land investment, and lending are given, respectively, by
~C lt = ~t (13)
Qt~t = ~Qt+1~t+1 + ~b~L
 w
t+1 (14)
~t = ~(1 +Rt+1)~t+1: (15)
Denoting f;g as the Lagrangian multipliers of constraints (5) and (7), respectively, the
rst-order conditions of the borrower with respect to consumption, land investment, capital
investment, and borrowing are given, respectively, by
[Ct   Ct 1] B = t (16)
Qtt = Qt+1t+1 + 
Yt+1
Lt+1
t+1 +Qt+1t (17)
15With internalized habit formation, equation (10) becomes
t [Ct   Ct 1] B   t+1 [Ct+1   Ct] B = ~t ~C lt :
Equations (11) and (12) will remain the same. Hence, if the borrowers consumption level C goes to zero in
the steady state, then the model has the same dynamics as that with external habit. In the steady state, the
lenders consumption level must be positive because of a lower discounting factor. Hence, the above equation
implies that
lim
t!1
n
[Ct   Ct 1] B    [Ct+1   Ct] B
o
= 0;
which implies limt!1 [Ct   Ct 1] = 0. Hence, limt!1 Ct = 0.
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t = t+1


Yt+1
Kt+1
+ 1  

+ (1  )t (18)
t = (1 +Rt+1)t+1 + (1 +Rt+1)t: (19)
A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of positive prices fQt; Rtg1t=0 and positive allocationsn
Ct; ~Ct; Kt+1; Lt+1; ~Lt+1;
o1
t=0
such that: (i)
n
Ct; ~Ct; Kt+1; Lt+1; ~Lt+1;
o1
t=0
satises the rst-
order conditions (13)-(19), the transversality conditions, limt!1 ttLt+1 = 0; limt!1 ttKt+1 =
0; limt!1 ~t~t ~Lt+1 = 0; and the complementarity condition, t [QtLt + (1  )Kt   (1 +Rt)Bt] =
0 for all t  0, given fQt; Rtg1t=0 and the initial endowments L0  0; ~L0  0; B0  0; K0  0;
(ii) The good and asset markets clear for all t, Ct+ ~Ct+Kt+1  (1  )Kt = Yt and Lt+ ~Lt = L,
respectively.
The model has a unique steady-state equilibrium in which the borrower is credit-constrained,
i.e., equation (7) binds. In steady state, equation (15) indicates that the interest rate is de-
termined by the lenders time discounting factor, 1 + R = ~ 1. This interest rate of loanable
funds is di¤erent from the "natural" rate determined by the rms marginal product of capital.
Equation (19) then implies  = (~   ) > 0, suggesting that the borrowing constraint binds
around the steady state.16 Equation (18) implies that the capital-to-output ratio is given by
K
Y
= 
1 (1 ) (1 )( ~ ) , which determines (in conjonction with the marginal product of land)
the natural rate of interest in the terminology of Wicksell. The natural rate would equal the
loanable funds rate if  = ~; or, as in the rst-best economy, if there exists perfect risk sharing
without borrowing constraints.17 Notice that the capital-to-output ratio increases with , sug-
gesting that borrowing constraints entice consumers to save more than necessary when capital
can serve as a collateralized asset. Equation (17) implies Q = (1   ~) 1 Y
L
=
P1
j=0
~j Y
L
,
suggesting that the price of land is determined by the present value of its marginal products. The
lenders budget constraint implies ~C = Y +(1  ~)(1 )K, suggesting that the lenders con-
sumption level is a fraction  of aggregate output plus the average per-period collateral value
of capital, (1 )KP1
j=0
~j
. The borrowers budget constraint implies C+

 + (1 )P1
j=0
~j

K+Y = Y ,
where the average collateral value of capital reects the excess savings on capital accumula-
tion besides depreciation. The second part of the savings, Y , nances the downpayment.
16In a model similar to ours, Iacoviello (2005) uses numerical methods to show that the probability of a
non-binding borrowing constraint is very small even when the model is su¢ ciently away from the steady state.
17The gap between the natural rate and the loan rate in the steady state reects a premium or wedge created
by borrowing constraints.
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This indicates that investment deviates from savings because of credit lending. All of the
great ratios (e.g., capital-to-output ratio, land-to-output ratio, consumption-to-output ratio)
are determined as functions of the models structural parameters only. Once the steady-state
distribution of land is determined, the steady-state values of all other variables are determined
through the great ratios. Because equation (17) is the demand curve of land and equation (14)
gives the supply curve of land, the steady-state distribution of land across agents is determined
uniquely by the implicit equation,

Y (L)
L
= ~b
 
L  L w ~C(L)l ; (20)
where the left-hand side decreases in L and the right-hand side increases in L.
2.4 Quantitative Implications
The models stationary equilibrium path is solved by log-linearizing the model around the
steady state. As in KM and others in this literature,18 we assume that this is a deterministic
economy with perfect foresight and the borrowing constraint always binds. And we examine
the dynamics of the model near the steady state after a sudden unexpected shock to TFP.
Calibration. The time period is a quarter. As a benchmark, we set the collateral value of
capital  = 0 (in accord with KM), the lenders discounting factor ~ = 0:99 (implying a 4%
annual interest rate), the rate of capital depreciation  = 0:025; capitals income share  = 0:35;
land share  = 0:05, and the utility weight parameter b is set so that the steady-state ratio
of land allocated between the two types of agents ~L
L
= 1. The results are not very sensitive
to these particular parameter values (i.e., 1-10% changes in these values give similar results).19
The risk aversion parameters for the lender, fl; wg, determine the volatility of asset prices
in the model and are hence left free for experiments. The shape of the impulse responses
are sensitive to several parameters, including the degree of habit persistence , the borrowers
discounting factor  and risk aversion B. In general, the stronger the borrowers incentive to
borrow, the more likely the credit cycle. In Figure 1, we present two sets of values for the three
parameters. In the rst set, we choose  = 0:9;  = 0:5; B = 4, and we assume the shock is
i:i:d. In the second set, we choose  = 0:95;  = 0:9; B = 2, and in this case the shock is
persistent with an AR(1) coe¢ cient of 0:9.20
18See, e.g., Kocherlakota (2000), Cordoba and Ripoll (2004a), and Iacoviello (2005).
19Under these parameter values, the implied steady-state consumption level of the lender is small, less than
2:5% of aggregate output.
20The parameter values for  around 0:9 and 0:95 are consistent with the most recent estimates of habit
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Impulse Responses. The impulse responses of the model to a one-time one-percent increase
in TFP (i.e., an i:i:d: shock) are graphed in the top row windows in gure 1 and those under
persistent shocks in the bottom row windows. The left column windows in gure 1 show the
responses of aggregate output (Y ), aggregate consumption (C+ ~C), aggregate capital formation
(Kt+1), and the borrowers land investment (Lt+1) when the lender is risk neutral (l = w = 0);
and the right column windows in gure 1 show the responses of aggregate output, aggregate
consumption, the price of land (Qt), and the gross interest rate (Rt) when the lender is risk
averse: l = w = 1. In the top windows, since it is a one-period shock with zero persistence,
any serial correlation in the impulse responses is generated endogenously within the model. In
the bottom windows, the hump-shaped dynamics reect endogenous propagation mechanisms
because the TFP shock has only AR(1) monotonic persistence. Regardless of the persistence
of the shock, with a risk neutral lender (left column windows), the land price and interest rate
in the model are constant; hence, credit-resource reallocations or debt uctuations are driven
by the quantities of collateralized assets. Whereas with a risk averse lender (right column
windows), the land possession of both the lender and the borrower becomes constant but the
land price uctuates; hence, credit-resource or debt reallocations are driven by the value of
collateralized assets. In either case, changes in the nominal size (total volume) of collateral can
formation in the literature; see, e.g., Chen and Ludvigson (2004).
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drive the entire economy to uctuate through credit lending and investment activities.
Figure 1. Top: Responses to i.i.d. Shock ( = 0:9;  = 0:5; B = 4).
Bottom: Responses to Persistent Shock ( = 0:95;  = 0:9; B = 2).
The top left window in gure 1 shows that a purely transitory shock can generate highly
persistent and hump-shaped uctuations in aggregate activities, due to the presence of stable
complex eigenvalues in the linearized system. The dynamic multiplier-accelerator e¤ect on
aggregate output reaches its maximum after 6 periods of the shock and the increase in output
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at the peak is about 125% of the shock itself on TFP.21 The economy over-shoots its steady
state from above as it retreats from the initial boom and enters a recession before settling down
on a long-run steady state via dampened cycles. New capital formation and land investment
are excessively volatile and procyclical, suggesting that credit resources are rapidly pumped
into the production sector from the nancial system, resulting in the typical phenomenon of
"over-investment" described by Tugan-Baranovsky (1894) and Wicksell (1906).22 The length of
each boom-bust cycle is about 10 11 years long under the current parameterization.23 Because
the lender is risk neutral, the interest rate and land price do not change over time, albeit the
marginal product of capital changes dramatically.24
However, the nature of the credit cycle is not sensitive to the degree of risk aversion of
the lender. The top right window in gure 1 shows that investment, output, and consumption
uctuate in the same manner with a similar magnitude and cyclical length when the lenders
risk aversion parameters are set to l = w = 1. In this case, the quantity of the collateralized
asset (land) becomes constant but the land price starts to uctuate violently, producing cyclical
uctuations in the credit limit and bringing the entire economy to uctuate along with it.
The above results suggest that uctuations in land price are not crucial for generating the
credit cycle and they weaken the criticism raised against the KMmodel (see, e.g., the discussion
regarding the lack of hedging against movements in land price by Krishnamurthy, 2003).25 The
multiplier-accelerator mechanism is preserved under the second parameter set as shown in the
bottom windows in gure 1. Although the degree of habit formation in both cases is in the
upper range of empirical estimates, and the time discounting factor of the borrower is quite
low, these parameter values can be further relaxed if we allow endogenous labor supply (see
Section 3).
As a comparison, the impulse responses of the "rst-best" allocation to a one-time positive
shock to TFP are graphed in gure 2, where the parameter values are exactly the same as in the
competitive equilibrium (top windows in gure 1) with risk averse lenders (i.e., l = w = 1).
It shows that the impact of the shock on output is not amplied, and it is short-lived with zero
21To see the dramatic di¤erence between our model and that of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), the readers may
compare gure 1 with their gure 3 (p.238).
22For more discussions on over-investment, see the last paragraph of this subsection.
23This cyclical frequency accidently coincides with the length of the business cycles documented by Tugan-
Baranovsky (1894) for 19th century England. Changing the parameter values can also change the length of the
cycles in our model.
24The response of aggregate output on impact is one percent because all production factors are predetermined
and there is no labor. In the second period and beyond, changes in output are completely driven by land and
capital accumulations. There is a downward kink in output in the second period because the accumulated asset
stocks are not large enough to completely o¤set the withdraw of the TFP shock.
25In fact, we have also experimented with a one-sector model without land and with capital as collateral, in
which the price of capital is xed at unity. The obtained results are similar.
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persistence. Although investment is more volatile than output, the capital stock is as smooth
as consumption.26
Figure 2. Impulse Responses in a First-Best Allocation.
Over-Investment. Historically, "over-investment" mainly means "investment in excess of
savings". Sometimes it also means "excessive investment volatility". Based on the rst de-
nition, over-investment is not possible in general equilibrium at the aggregate level in a
representative-agent closed economy. However, it is possible in an open economy, or in a closed
economy at the disaggregate level for a subset of the agents, if there exist lending and borrow-
ing among the agents (or countries). In our model, over-investment of the non-banking sector
(the borrower) is possible and this takes place when investment of the borrower is partially
nanced by the her own savings and partially by the lenders savings (loans). The borrowers
investment is given by It = Kt+1   (1   )Kt + Qt(Lt+1   Lt), and her savings given by
St = Yt Ct = ~Ct+Kt+1  (1  )Kt. Hence, over-investment takes place if Qt(Lt+1 Lt) > ~Ct.
Thus, whenever land is reallocated from the lender to the borrower in a su¢ ciently large amount,
there exists over-investment. However, in this paper we focus more on the second aspect of the
notion of over-investment, namely, excessive investment volatility.27
26As changes of the capital stock, investment is a ow variable and is hence more volatile than capital in per-
centage terms. The log-linear relationship between investment and capital is given by it = 1 (kt+1   (1  )kt).
In the competitive equilibrium of our model, the capital stock is far more volatile than output, suggesting an
even greater volatility of investment. Because movements in other variables appear to be trivial relative to
investment, we plot the capital stock instead of investment series in gure 1.
27Notice that a larger volatility of investment than that of savings in the log-linear system does not necessarily
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2.5 Sensitivity Analysis
(i) Endogenous credit limits are important. As emphasized by KM and Kocherlakota (2000),
credit limits based on the value of collateralized assets are important for generating an en-
dogenous propagation mechanism. This is also true in our model. We have explored a model
with constant credit limits, that is, (1 + Rt+1)Bt+1  B, and conrmed that there are no
multiplier-accelerator e¤ects, hence no hump-shaped credit cycles under standard and empiri-
cally plausible parameter values. This is because the supply of credit is no longer elastic and
procyclical with a constant credit limit. Consequently, over-investment will not occur because
of the lack of the Tugan-Wicksellian credit channel to nance it. However, albeit necessary, en-
dogenous credit limits are not by themselves su¢ cient for generating the multiplier-accelerator
mechanism (more discussions on this point appear below).
Figure 3. Impulse Responses without Habit Formation ( = 0).
(ii) Production asymmetry is important. In our model, the lender provides loans but does
not produce goods. This asymmetry between the nancial role of the lender and the productive
role of the borrower is meant to capture the idea of Tugan and Wicksell and is important for the
multiplier e¤ect of credit constraints on aggregate output. If the lender also produces goods,
as in the model of KM and Cordoba-Ripoll (2004a), then resource reallocation between the
lender and the borrower not only generates counter-cyclical uctuations in lenders output, but
imply investment in excess of savings, because a log-linear variable measures only percentage deviations relative
to its own steady state. Although the excessive volatilities of capital and land investment in our model are due
to elastic credit supply, they may or may not indicate over-investment (in excess of savings).
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also dampens the magnitude of the cycle so that the peak response of aggregate output to a
one-time aggregate TFP shock takes place only in the impact period and the response is less
than one-for-one after the impact period.28
(iii) Habit formation is important. Without habit formation, the model has no hump-
shaped credit cycles. For example, setting  = 0 in the basic model leads to monotonic impulse
responses as shown in gure 3.29
2.6 Dissecting the Mechanism
To understand the intuition behind the above results, especially the role played by CUWJ and
collateral constraints, consider a simpler version of the basic model where the lender is risk
neutral (l = w = 0) and there is no capital. Risk neutrality implies a constant interest rate,
(1 + R) = ~ 1, and a constant land price Q according to equations (13)-(15). Equation (19)
then becomes t = ~t   t+1. Assume B = 1 and the borrowing constraint binds:
(1 +R)Bt+1 = QLt+1: (21)
The leverage e¤ect of collateralized borrowing modies the borrowers budget constraint in the
following way:
Ct +QLt+1   (QLt   (1 +R)Bt) = ~QLt+1 + ALt ; (22)
where the third term on the left-hand side vanishes because the borrower sells the current
land stock to repay the last-period debt, that is, QLt = (1 + R)Bt. Therefore, the budget
constraint can be rewritten as Ct+QLt+1 = ~QLt+1+Yt, where the right-hand side is the sum
of collateralized borrowing and output, while the left-hand side sums up consumption and land
expenditure. Finally, the budget constraint simplies to
Ct +Q(1  ~)Lt+1 = ALt ; (23)
where Q(1  ~)Lt+1 is the downpayment required to invest in land: whenever investing QLt+1,
the borrower is lent ~QLt+1. In other words, leveraged lending permits the borrower to nance
investment at a level far exceeding his/her own savings because the downpayment is close to zero
28We have experimented with a variant of Cordoba-Ripolls (2004a) model in which both the lender and the
borrower produce goods and there is habit persistence. Our ndings are that such a setting still exhibits the
accelerator e¤ects (i.e., it can over-shoot the steady state and have cycles), but, not surprisingly, the multiplier
e¤ect is signicantly weakened.
29The next section shows that when labor supply is elastic, credit cycles occur for lower values of the habit
persistence parameter . However,  > 0 is still necessary for generating credit cycles.
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under our parameterization implying that ~ is close to one. Suppose there is no habit formation
( = 0), this leveraged lending would imply that the borrower has a strong incentive to raise
consumption when income increases, knowing that it is possible to nance investment largely
through borrowing. This kills the boom-bust cyclical mechanism by discouraging investment.
To see this analytically, combine the rst-order conditions (16)-(17) and (19) by eliminating
t, we get
Q(1  ~) 1
Ct   Ct 1 = 
Yt+1
Lt+1
1
Ct+1   Ct : (24)
This equation determines the value of land in the steady state as the present value of the
marginal products: Q = 1
1 ~
Y
L
. Equations (21), (23), and (24) plus a standard transversality
condition fully determine the dynamic equilibrium paths of fCt; Lt; Btg in this simple model.30
When  = 0, the model has closed-form solutions, with the decision rules of consumption, debt,
and land investment given by the simple relationships,
Ct = (1  )ALt ; (25)
Bt+1 =
~
(1  ~)AL

t ; (26)
Lt+1 =

(1  ~)QAL

t : (27)
Notice that all decision variables are proportional to aggregate output. Log-linearizing the
decision rules around the steady state gives ct = bt+1 = lt+1 = lt, where lower-case variables
denote percentage deviations from the steady state. In this case, a one-percent increase in
current output leads to a one-percent increase in the levels of both consumption and new
debt, which in turn translates into a one-percent increase in land stock (Lt+1) and a -percent
increase in the next periods output. Thus, with the borrower as the single producer in the
economy, a one-time shock to TFP can generate serially correlated movements in aggregate
output with the degree of persistence determined by . This roughly explains the result obtained
by Kocherlakota (2000) and Cordoba and Ripoll (2004a).
However, the -persistence is monotonic and there do not exist hump-shaped boom-bust
cycles in the simple model without either habits or CUWJ e¤ect. That is, endogenous credit
constraints, by themselves, generate endogenous persistence but do not give rise to the hump-
shaped multiplier-accelerator mechanism, unless, as shown by KM, a particular form of lumpy
investment is introduced.
30The lenders consumption level is simply determined by interest income.
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In order to generate a more persistent and hump-shaped propagation mechanism, we need
a larger fraction of the income to be saved and invested in each period, rather than being
consumed. This is why the picture changes dramatically when there is habit formation ( > 0).
Habit formation creates a strong incentive for the borrowers to save the transitory income so
as to increase future consumption in the long run. With habit formation, agents are more
interested in consumption growth than in the consumption level. Hence, after a TFP shock to
income, the borrowers increase their marginal propensity to save, which provides more loanable
funds for investment. This motive for wealth accumulation is reinforced by the borrowers
desires to borrow under the collateralized lending, thus they opt to invest as much as possible
not only to ensure future consumption growth but also to raise the collateral value so as to
further reduce the borrowing constraint. To see this, note that equation (24) indicates that
with  > 0 and holding tomorrow constant, a one-percent increase in consumption today due to
a one-percent increase in income is no longer optimal because it decreases the left-hand side of
(24) by more than one percent (due to the habit stock Ct 1) while the right-hand side would
decrease by less than one percent after land investment (Lt+1) raises by one percent (due to
the rise in the habit stock Ct). Hence, to reach an equilibrium, consumption should increase
by less than one percent and land investment should increase by more than one percent. This
higher investment level will bring about not only more output next period but also more credit
by relaxing the borrowing constraint in the current period. Thus, the incentive for saving under
habit formation and the motives for investment under leveraged lending start to reinforce each
other dynamically, making possible a cumulative process of output expansion and investment
boom that underlies a persistent and hump-shaped propagation mechanism.
However, because of diminishing marginal product of capital, over-investment is not sustain-
able by aggregate savings and a rising debt level will ultimately erode the borrowersaggregate
demand (consumption and investment), resulting in a collapse of the "bubble" followed by a
recession. In the downturn phase, the sluggish behavior of consumption and investment under
CUWJ forces the economy to converge back to steady state in a cyclical fashion. Therefore,
output falls below its long run level for a while so that a recession inevitably follows the invest-
ment boom. This multiplier-accelerator cyclical mechanism can be cast more formally in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 Consider the model without capital ( =  = 0), with a risk-neutral lender
(l = w = 0) and logarithmic utility for the borrower (B = 1). Then there exists a threshold
 2 (0; 1) such that if  > , then output amplication to a one-time TFP shock is larger than
one; and it approximately equals 1= > 1 if  is close enough to one. In addition, the linearized
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system has a pair of stable, complex eigenvalues.
Proof. The log-linearized dynamics obtained from equations (16), (23), and (24) are given by:
t+1 = t + (1  )lt+1 (28)
ct = ct 1   (1  )t (29)
(1  )ct + lt+1 = lt (30)
Equation (29) tells us that ct  ct 1 when   1, which means that c1  c0 = 0. On the
other hand, (30) gives l2 =   (1  )c1, where  is the initial TFP shock in period one.
Therefore, neglecting c1, one gets that l2= = 1=, that is, y2= = 1= > 1. By continuity,
therefore, there exists a threshold value  such that output amplication is larger than one
provided that  > . In addition, it is not di¢ cult to show, by manipulating the associated
characteristic polynomial, that equations (28)-(30) have a pair of stable, complex eigenvalues
if  > .
3 Introducing Elastic Labor
This section introduces endogenous labor by allowing borrowers to supply hours worked elasti-
cally. Because habit formation induces a strong negative income e¤ect with standard separable
preferences, labor supply decreases after a positive TFP shock. This is inconsistent with the
data. In contrast, the absence of income e¤ects ensures that labor is procyclical, in accord
with the US data. For this reason, we follow Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Hu¤man (1988) by
adopting the following utility function with no income e¤ect:
1
1  B

Ct    Ct 1   PtN
1+
t
1 + 
1 B
;   0; (31)
where P is the population size of the representative family of borrowers, N hours worked
for each member of the family, and C the familys total consumption.31 This type of utility
function without income e¤ect on labor supply is widely used in the RBC literature.32 Taking
the normalization P = 1, the aggregate production function is given by
Yt = AK

t L

tN
1  
t : (32)
31We assume perfect risk sharing among family members.
32See, e.g.,Greenwood et al. (1988), Mendoza (1991), Correia et al. (1995), Perri and Neumeyer (2005), and
Jaimovich and Rebelo (2008).
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The rst-order condition with respect to hours worked is given by
Nt = (1    )
Yt
Nt
; (33)
which shows that labor supply depends only on the real wage (the marginal product of labor)
and not on consumption. The elasticity of labor supply is 1

. Based on this rst-order relation-
ship, the steady state utility level is strictly positive only if the inequality, (1 + ) (1  ) >
(1      )Y
C
, holds; which imposes constraints on the values of  and . For example, if  is
close to one, then  must be very large. This model reduces back to the basic model with xed
labor if  =1.
3.1 Competitive Equilibrium
To facilitate comparison, all common parameters are set at exactly the same values as those in
the basic model of section 2 (top windows in gure 1), which imply labors share (1    ) =
0:6. The elasticity parameter of labor supply is set at  = 6, implying a labor supply elasticity
of 0:17, which is consistent with the microeconomic literatures nding of a relatively small
labor supply elasticity. Reducing  (increasing the elasticity of labor supply) further will make
the multiplier-accelerator e¤ect even stronger and more dramatic, and the system may converge
to a Hopf limit cycle as  tends to zero. On the other hand, increasing  (reducing the labor
supply elasticity) reduces the multiplier-accelerator e¤ect and in the limit as  tends to innity,
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the system converges back to the basic model presented above.
Figure 4. Top: Responses to i.i.d Shock ( = 0:9;  = 0:5; B = 4).
Bottom: Responses to Persistent Shock ( = 0:85;  = 0:9; B = 1).
With endogenous labor, the multiplier-accelerator mechanism of collateral constraints is
amplied, as shown in the top windows of gure 4. The peak response of output is larger and
the length of the cycle is longer. For example, with  = 6, the peak response of output is 5
times the size of the shock and it is reached 28 periods (7 years) after the impact period. The
length of the cycle is around 120 periods (30 years). Also, the recession following the initial
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boom period is longer and more pronounced.
The nature of the multiplier-accelerator can be adjusted by varying the borrowers incentives
to borrow. For example, if the borrower is less risk averse, less habit forming in consumption,
or more patient, then the length of the cycle and the magnitude of the hump are altered. As
an example, the bottom windows in gure 4 graph the impulse responses of the model when
the borrowers risk aversion parameter is set to B = 1, habit persistence  = 0:85, and time
discunting  = 0:9. With an AR(1) coe¢ cient of 0:9, then the peak of the rst hump in the
responses of aggregate output is reached only after 3 periods and the length of the cycle is much
shorter than before, despite the shock is persistent.
3.2 Policy Implications
Figure 5. Stabilization E¤ects of a Consumption Tax.
If optimal stabilizing policies exist, they must be time varing in nature (see our working
paper, Pintus and Wen, 2008). However, such complex optimal tax rules are di¢ cult to im-
plement. What we observe in reality are most often simple tax policies, such as constant-rate
sales tax. What are the e¤ects of such simple policies? Figure 5 shows the impulse responses
of aggregate output (in the economy with labor and risk neutral lender as in top windows in
gure 4) to a one-time TFP shock under di¤erent steady-state consumption tax rates. The re-
sults show that as the tax rate increases, aggregate output is gradually stabilized with smaller
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amplication and reduced persistence. Therefore, a constant-rate consumption tax does have
stabilization e¤ects when the tax rate is high enough. The intuition for the stabilization ef-
fect is that consumption tax discourages consumption demand, which reduces the incentive
for borrowing, hence mitigating the multiplier-accelerator e¤ects of the credit constraints on
investment. Similar results can also be obtained under income tax policies.
However, simple tax policies cannot achieve the "rst-best" allocation, more often they also
introduce further distortions into the economy. As an example, we examine the business cycle
e¤ects of a sudden, unexpected, (one-period) 1% income-tax cut on the competitive economy
with labor. Such a tax reduction is meant to boost the economy by increasing the after-tax
marginal rates of return to work and investment. However, we show that such policies intended
to stimulate the economy can be counter-productive and generate a long-period of recession
instead of a boom.
Consider a standard income tax  on aggregate output Y . The borrowers resource constraint
becomes
Ct+Qt(Lt+1 Lt)+Kt+1  (1  )Kt+(1+Rt)Bt  Bt+1+(1  t)AKt LtN1  t +Tt; (34)
where T = Y is a lump-sum transfer payment. Suppose the steady-state income tax rate is
20%; then a one-percent sudden decrease in the income tax rate has the following dynamic
e¤ects shown in gure 6:
Figure 6. Impulse Responses to an Income-Tax Cut.
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The intuition for the prolonged recession caused by a tax cut is as follows. Initially, a tax cut
increases the incentives for working and investing. Hence, there is a short boom in the initial
period in aggregate consumption, investment, labor, and output. However, since TFP has not
changed, the increase in output is fully due to higher labor supply. Also, because the tax cut
is nanced by an equal decrease in the lump-sum transfer, the initial increase in aggregate
demand is supported heavily by borrowing. Therefore, the debt level increases sharply in the
second period and it chokes o¤ investment because the natural rate is below the loan rate. As
investment decreases in the second period, the multiplier-accelerator mechanism kicks in and
generates a cumulative process of contraction. Therefore, the stimulative package of a tax cut
is counter-productive.
4 Conclusion
The history of economic thought has long suggested that boom-bust business cycles may be
driven by over-investment fueled by credit expansion. Tugan-Baranovsky (1894) argued that
industrial cycles were driven by an independent investment function and that, ultimately, over-
investment was the cause of recessions. Similarly, Wicksell (1906) proposed making investment
independent of savings so aggregate demand is free to rise above or fall below a given level
of aggregate supply. A common theme of this line of economic reasoning is to emphasize the
important role of credit. However, in general equilibrium, income stimulates consumption,
consumption reduces savings, yet investment requires savings to nance. Hence, boom-bust
cycles featuring simultaneous increases in consumption and investment (i.e., co-movements)
and their collapses are di¢ cult to generate in standard general-equilibrium models without pe-
riodic movements in TFP. Using a two-agent RBC model featuring a productive borrower who
is credit-constrained but has a strong incentive to accumulate wealth by saving and an unpro-
ductive lender who hoards idle resources but is willing to lend, this paper shows that dynamic
interactions between the two forces create a boom-bust cyclical mechanism that embodies some
of the ideas and insights of Tugan-Baranovsky and Wicksell.
Habit formation or CUWJ preferences induce highly persistent consumption growth under
income shocks. With the interest rate of loanable funds below the households time discount
rate, this leads to strong incentives for asset accumulation not only through savings but also
from external borrowing. Because of endogenous credit constraints, rms also have incentives
to invest in productive assets, which enhances their credit worthiness, enabling them to borrow
even more both in the current and in the future periods so as to meet persistent demand
for consumption (sales) growth. The supply of credit reallocates resources from unproductive
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agents to productive agents; hence, it enhances aggregate productivity and fullls the initial
desire for wealth accumulation from households, leading to a cumulative process of output
expansion and investment boom.33 However, as the expansion continues, the debt level rises
persistently while the marginal product of assets diminishes quickly. The rising debt level and
the growing costs of borrowing erode the available funds for investment, eventually putting
an end on the boom and setting o¤ a contraction. The contraction process accelerates itself
towards the steady state because less investment implies less collateral, which implies less
credit-worthiness and less loans; in addition, excessive consumption smoothing implies that
less consumption today leads to less consumption tomorrow, which further reduces incentives
for wealth accumulation and investment demand. Thus, an important feature of the contraction
process is the lack of su¢ cient aggregate demand and sharp drop in investment. This process
will continue until a point where the marginal product of assets is signicantly higher than
its steady-state level and the interest rate so that borrowing and investment become protable
again.34 Thus, under the interaction between wealth accumulation and procyclical credit supply,
a small shock can trigger a process of boom-bust cycles in credit lending and aggregate activities.
In this process, credit resources are unleashed out from the banking sector to the public during
an expansion, and sucked back to the banking sector during a contraction.35
Our results reinforce the ndings of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) that highly elastic credit
supply has devastating consequences. This may help explaining not only why developing coun-
tries (where the supply of credit is severely constrained yet at the same time highly elastic
because of endogenous credit limits, insider dealing, corruption, weak corporate governance,
and speculative international capital ows) are more volatile and susceptible to economic crises
than developed countries, but also why lowered credit standards in the subprime mortgage
market designed to meet persistent housing demand for low-income households could have
been responsible for the recent nancial turmoil in the U.S.
Our model may be viewed as a prototype for many possible extensions. For example, asset
pricing, the housing market, oil shocks, sticky prices, monetary policies, imperfect competition,
international trade, small-open economy, and so on, can be embedded into our model to study
their implications for boom-bust cycles.
33Without the excessive consumption-smoothing motive, the initial rise in income would be consumed rather
than saved to nance investment.
34Neither Tugan-Baranovsky (1894) nor Wicksell (1906) had a formal theory of the turning points of the
business cycle, although Wicksell conjectured that the uctuations in the marginal product of capital were
important for understanding the turning points.
35This process of credit cycles was visualized by Tugan-Baranovsky (1894) as the motion of a steam engine.
When the pressure of the steam attained a certain level, the resistance of the piston was overcome and it was
set in motion, before returning again to its original position when the steam was exhausted (Barnett, 2001).
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